From Khiva I made the journey back eastwards to
Tashkent by train from Urgench. It was a slow, trundling overnight journey of
almost twenty hours, but my sleeper compartment was relatively comfortable.
Much of the journey took us across the bleak landscape of the Kyzylkum Desert.
I had planned to have supper in the restaurant wagon. My host in Khiva had told
me that, as this was a domestic, Uzbekistan train, there should be no trouble
getting a meal. By contrast, he said, on the international trains from Russia
all the food had gone long before the train reached Urgench. But my companion
in the compartment had other ideas. To my surprise, when he entered the
compartment he automatically started speaking to me in Uzbek. Was it not clear
from my appearance that I was a foreigner? I felt quite pleased with myself.
Once he understood, he seemed delighted, repeatedly shaking my hand and
clapping me on the back. I was slightly dismayed when he produced a pair of
two-litre bottles of beer which he insisted on sharing with me. The idea of a
long booze-filled journey was not especially appealing. It could have been
worse; he didn’t have vodka. He then produced a nan loaf of bread (the typical
Central Asian loaf, known to Russians as a lepyoshka) and a pot of beef stew. Eating
was with the hands. I was a little disconcerted by his habit, as host, of
taking pieces of meat between his fingers and offering them to me. But it was
tasty, and I was grateful.
Back in Tashkent for just a single night, early the
next morning I made my way to the place where shared taxis set off for the
Fergana Valley. There are trains from Tashkent to Fergana, but they pass
through Tajikistan, and I did not have the necessary double-entry visas. The
road over the mountains, through the narrow strip of territory that links the
Fergana Valley with the rest of Uzbekistan, is a good, fast road. But for some
reason buses are not allowed along it. On this occasion I waited several hours
before the taxi had enough passengers to depart. Driving through the pass into
the Valley, there is a big checkpoint, looking very much like a border post, at
which IDs are checked, and at which all foreigners entering or exiting the Valley
have to be registered. It was a formality, but, handing over my passport, it
felt like I was entering a different country.
Fergana does feel different, distinct. The Valley, in
fact a large plain surrounded by mountains, is divided up among three former
Soviet republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, their borders twisting
around each other crazily, breaking up the natural unity of the Valley and
cutting off its different parts from each other. Fed by tributaries of the Syr-Darya
River, it is the most fertile region of Central Asia, quite different from the
mountains, desert and steppe that predominate elsewhere. It is the most densely
populated part of Central Asia too, and accounts for a large share of its
agriculture. Through millennia of shifting boundaries, Fergana’s unity had been
maintained until the Soviet period, when Stalin, as commissar for
nationalities, sought to impose a national division on to Central Asia that had
never been known before. But the different nations were jumbled up, and could
not be neatly parcelled out among the newly created republics. It mattered less
during the Soviet period, when they were all united within the one overarching
union. But since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it has brought no end of
tension, especially between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Despite the overlaying of national identities on the
former Khanates of Central Asia, strong regional identities remain important,
and have been the key to understanding political divisions in all the Soviet
successor states of the region. In Uzbekistan, the Fergana Valley is regarded
with suspicion by the Tashkent elite, which has resulted in violent
confrontations. Among the distinctive traits of the Valley is its conservatism,
and greater piety. It has also been a breeding ground for Islamist militants.
The founders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was active in
Tajikistan during its civil war in the 1990s, and alongside the Taliban in
Afghanistan, came from the Fergana Valley. The movement was largely destroyed
along with the Taliban during the US-led invasion in Afghanistan in 2001, its
remnants scattered, some of them taking refuge in Pakistan. While there has in
recent years been little evidence of any Islamist threat in Fergana, it has
nevertheless suited the Karimov regime to brand any manifestation of opposition
in the Valley as extremist.
The Khan's palace, Kokand
My first destination in the Valley was Kokand, the
former capital of the Kokand Khanate, which in the 18th and 19th centuries had
ruled over eastern Uzbekistan, including Tashkent, as well as bits of southern
Kazakhstan and much of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kokand does not match its
one-time rival, Bukhara, for fine architecture and historical monuments. This
is partly because of the extensive destruction that accompanied the Bolshevik
crackdown in 1918 on the so-called ‘Kokand Autonomy’, a rival to Bolshevik
rule, during which many thousands of the city’s inhabitants were slaughtered
during a three-day orgy of rape and destruction by the Red Army. Among old
photos from the early 20th century in the museum in the former Khan’s palace,
there is one that shows the destruction of the medressas in Kokand at that
time.
It rained during most of my short stay in Kokand, but
still I trudged around the old city, seeking out the remaining historical
buildings. The Khan’s palace sits in a park on the other side of the main
thoroughfare that bisects the city centre from the maze of streets that form
the old town. It was built in the early 1870s, just as Kokand was succumbing to
Russian rule. Following the Russian seizure of Tashkent in 1865, Khudayar Khan
was forced, in 1868, to accept vassal status vis-à-vis the Tsar. But in 1875
just a couple of years after the completion of the palace, a rebellion drove
him into exile. His replacement by his anti-Russian son prompted the Russians,
the following year, to abolish the khanate and bring it under direct Russian
rule, as part of Russian Turkestan. The palace has been partly restored, and
now houses a museum. Interiors are richly decorated with elaborate geometric
and floral patterns. The harem was demolished by the Russians in 1919.
The Narbuta-Bey Medressa, Kokand
Among the few remaining medressas (there were once 35
in Kokand, and hundreds of mosques), the Narbuta-Bey Medressa, having been
closed by the Bolsheviks, was reopened after independence, only to be closed
again in 2008. It has an imposing façade, reminiscent of medressas in Bukhara.
Built at the end of the 18th century, craftsmen from Bukhara who had been taken
captive in warfare between the two neighbouring khanates were brought to work
on its construction. An elderly man appeared at the entrance, and showed me
around. Having visited many disused medressas in the region, it was interesting
here to peer into one of the cells leading off the courtyard, which had been
restored. Sparsely decorated, there was a platform at the back of the room
where students would have slept, on the floor a carpet. The cells on the
outside of the building, flanking the entrance, were occupied.
Behind the medressa is an old graveyard, including a
couple of rather grand mausoleums where members of the Kokand royal family were
laid to rest. Among them is Nodira, the wife of Umar Khan. When her husband
died in 1822, leaving an heir who was still a child, Nodira took over as ruler,
evidence that, in the Islamic world too, it was not doubted that women were no
less capable of ruling than men, even if it was never publicly acknowledged.
Nodira was most notable as a poet, considered one of Uzbekistan’s greatest. She
wrote in both Uzbek and Tajik. Under her, Kokand became a centre of the arts.
She remains a hugely popular figure in Uzbekistan, and Nodira is a popular
girl’s name. She appeared on a postage stamp issued after Uzbekistan’s independence.
Her son, Madali Khan, extended Kokand’s borders to their furthest extent, but
his expansionism brought down the wrath of Nasrullah Khan of Bukhara, who had
executed the two British emissaries, Stoddart and Conolly, that same year. In
1842, Nasrullah captured Kokand, and had Madali, his brother and Nodira all put
to death.
The old town, Kokand
From Kokand, I continued eastwards to Andijan, not far
from Osh, across the border in Kyrgyzstan, which I had visited the previous
year. This time I decided to go by bus. Kokand’s bus station is right by the
Dekhon Bazzar, with its busy little workshops, men hammering out pieces of
metal into the desired shapes, rows of stalls selling nan bread, towers off
water melons, and piles of grapes, oranges, olives and figs. I bought my
ticket, in fact just a little slip of paper with something the seller had
scribbled on it. And then I waited. Someone offered me a seat. Men came and
chatted to me. Where was I from? Which football team did I support?
Then the colourful little bus pulled up, and we all
piled in. Apparently the scrawl on my ticket included my seat number, but the
numbers on the seats did not go as high as mine, and in fact any idea of
reservations was a nonsense. Everyone took whichever they could. The friends I
had made while waiting took care of me, and I was given a seat. As we trundled
out of Kokand, more and more people piled in. Soon the bus was crammed full
with people from the villages along the way, together with the provisions they
had bought in the town. Some stood, others sat on their bags. It was all
immensely cheerful. However crushed and uncomfortable, people laughed and joked
and offered round pieces of fruit and biscuits, as if it were all a big party.
The ticket seller, who had to push and shove his way around the bus, joined in
the fun, joking as he went. He also spoke a little English. When he translated
my humdrum answers to his questions about myself, my home, the ladies around us
hooted with laughter. I smiled uncertainly, not knowing what he had told them
about me.
There are many good things about Andijan. First of
all, the hotel I stayed in was terrific; a big, comfortable room, a swimming
pool, and a marvellous breakfast, all for a very modest price. The thing I
enjoyed most of all was the melons. Fergana is famous for them. Andijan’s most celebrated
son is Babur, founder of the Mughal Empire. Born in Andijan, he succeeded as
ruler of Fergana near the end of the 15th century, at the age of 12. At 15, he
conquered Samarkand. However, facing rebellions, he ended up losing both
Andijan and Samarkand. His fortunes later rose, as he captured Kabul and ruled
Afghanistan before moving on to the conquest of India. But it seems he never
ceased to lament the loss of his homeland, or of Samarkand, the capital of his
ancestor, Timur. In his memoir, the Baburnameh, Babur wrote repeatedly of the
delights of melons. He knew what he was talking about. I have never eaten more
delicious, juicier, sweeter melons than those I ate in Andijan. Other fruits
were excellent as well. The figs were wonderful.
The Eski Bazaar, Andijan
I hopped in a minivan to go to the old town, clustered
around the sprawling Eski (‘Old’) Bazaar, one of the most inspiring in Central
Asia, with its piles of produce, the rich bounty of Fergana’s fertile land. I
ate there two or three times during my stay. Everything seemed tasty. The
salads were wonderful, the tomatoes sweet and delicious. It is something that
had struck me before in the Fergana Valley, during stays in Osh, in Kyrgyzstan,
as well as Khujand, in Tajikistan. The food is good in Fergana. It is typical,
simple Central Asian fare, laghman, manty, shashlik and the rest. But somehow
it is better, tastier, fresher. The chaikhana I frequented during my stay was
bustling with life and colour. Each time I received a warm greeting, and a
cheerful sense of fun as we tried to work out what I should eat. I found
Andijan delightful.
A chaikhana, Andijan
Since 2005, the name Andijan is associated with
something altogether more negative, the massacre that took place there in May
of that year. The violence of the security forces, the huge over-reaction of
the authorities, speaks volumes about the regime’s paranoia, its fear of its
own people. Concerns about the oppressiveness of the regime had been growing
for some time. Uzbekistan had acquired strategic importance for the United
States and its allies following the invasion of Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2005,
Uzbekistan hosted a US military base, which was used in supporting its
operations in Afghanistan. The importance of this trumped human rights
concerns. Things changed after the massacre. The Americans departed at the
insistence of the Uzbekistan government following US criticism of the bloodshed
in Andijan.
In 2004, the British ambassador in Uzbekistan, Craig
Murray, had been forced to resign following his outspoken criticism of the
country’s human rights record and what he saw as the tolerance of it by the US administration
of President George W. Bush. In an interview with the Guardian newspaper, he had
said that "there is no point in having cocktail-party relationships with a
fascist regime". Murray fell out of favour with the UK Foreign Office. He
was removed from his post in Tashkent, and agreed to resign from the diplomatic
service the following year. Whatever the reasons for his falling out of grace,
his case illustrates the dilemma faced by diplomats (and international
organisations) when they have to maintain relations with a distasteful regime.
Unlike many, Murray chose not to dodge that dilemma.
The backdrop to the massacre was the trial of 23 local
businessmen, who the authorities, with precious little evidence, accused of
Islamic extremist activities. Specifically, they were accused of membership of
the Akromiya movement, inspired by an imprisoned mathematician, Akrom
Yuldoshev, who in the early 1990s had written a pamphlet calling on businesses
to pool resources for the common good of society, in line with Islamic
principles. More likely is that they were caught up in a power struggle
following the purge of a long-serving Andijan governor. In a country submerged
in corruption and cronyism, the arrests may have been part of a crackdown on
businesses not under the thumb of the authorities. When the trial began in
February 2005, protesters gathered outside the courtroom, their numbers
gradually swelling over the following weeks.
Matters came to a head following the arrest on 12 May
of several protesters and relatives of the accused men. The next day, armed men
attacked the prison, releasing the 23 men as well as several hundred others.
Several prison guards were killed. The armed men also seized Andijan’s
government administration building, taking several senior officials hostage.
They tried but failed to take over the headquarters of the National Security
Service. Their principal demand was the resignation of Karimov. Whatever the
rights and wrongs of the trial, this was clearly a serious criminal act, an act
of rebellion, to which the authorities had to respond. But the violent and
indiscriminate nature of their response was beyond all proportion to the threat
they faced. The massacre came not long after the colour revolutions in Georgia
and Ukraine. Perhaps the example of those exercises in popular will impelled
Karimov to such a fierce response in Andijan. Perhaps he thought the US-led
‘war on terror’ gave him cover for such violence against his own citizens.
During 13 May, protesters continued to gather on the
central Bobur Square. That evening, the square was sealed off and security
forces attacked the crowds, according to witnesses firing indiscriminately. The
numbers of victims are disputed, but several hundred were killed, including
children. The government blamed Islamist extremists for the violence, but most
of the dead were ordinary civilians. Thousands of panicked people fled for the
border, seeking refuge in Kyrgyzstan. The crackdown did not stop there.
Following the events, many journalists went into exile. Several international
NGOs and media organisations were forced out. Uzbekistan’s already sham
democracy had been snuffed out, all pretence gone. This was now a regime whose
legitimacy derived from brute force.
Since the events of May 2005, Bobur Square has been
renamed Navoi Square, after Alisher Navoi, the great 16th century poet. The
statue of Babur that had stood there has been moved (it is now close to the
hotel where I stayed). A big open space, criss-crossed by major roads, there is
nothing to indicate what happened there. All is now peaceful, no obvious sign
of tension. A gang of colourfully dressed women tilled over the earth on a
roundabout at one end. The people of Andijan went busily about their work. They
smiled happily. They were welcoming and hospitable to the visiting foreigner.
But it cannot be imagined that the events of 2005 have been forgotten. The
scars are surely there.