Thursday, 27 September 2012

A journey in Kyrgyzstan

My journey through Kyrgyzstan began in Bishkek. It is a typically Soviet city of broad boulevards and grandiose (often crumbling) monuments. I was struck by one World War II memorial featuring two Kyrgyz soldiers, with an inscription in Russian on one side (there is one in Kyrgyz on the other) declaring “We were fighting for Communism”. There has been little effort to airbrush out the communist past, with one notable exception: the statue of Lenin, arm outstretched pointing to the future in one of the stock poses seen all over the former empire, has been removed from its plinth on the central Ala-Too Square (formerly Lenin Square), in front of the State Historical Museum, and replaced by the legendary national hero, Manas. Lenin has been moved to a more modest spot behind the museum. The cult of Manas has become ubiquitous in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, an officially-inspired nation-building myth to bolster a people’s pride and consolidate a newly independent state.

Inside the museum, a strange hotchpotch of displays sits awkwardly together. Here, Lenin has pride of place. Several statues of him, striking a variety of inspirational poses, dominate a whole floor, as he addresses different sections of Soviet society: here workers, there intellectuals. A huge statue dominates the cavernous central stairwell. Interspersed among the statues are exhibits about the revolutionary and the Great Patriotic wars, uniting the principal legitimising themes that underpinned Soviet rule. Fitted in uneasily among all this are more recent displays concerning the unrest in Bishkek in April 2010, which led to the deaths of dozens of protesters and the flight from the country of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. They appear to have been slotted into available space, incoherently, without any thought.

Upstairs, the main themes are prehistory and Kyrgyz folklore. Bizarrely, many of the mannequins draped in Kyrgyz national costumes have fair hair and blue eyes, rather than the Asiatic features of the Kyrgyz themselves. They would have been less out-of-place in shop windows. Perhaps these were standard mannequins used in Soviet-era department stores. The overall impression is of a country grappling uncertainly with its identity in the post-Soviet world, not sure what to do with its Soviet past, undecided about the motifs of its newly acquired independence.

Travelling east from Bishkek, I visit the Burana Tower, a Soviet-era reconstruction of a medieval minaret. There is little else to see now, a small museum, a collection of balbals, carved Turkic stone figures, and a mound of earth. Yet this was once Balasagun, an eleventh-century capital of the Karakhanids, a Turkic people who ruled a territory that included chunks of modern southern Kazakhstan, eastern Uzbekistan and western China. An artist’s impression attempts to give an idea of what it might have looked like in its heyday. Before the Karakhanids, Balasagun had belonged to the Sogdians, the Iranian people whose merchants once dominated the Silk Road, and whose language was the lingua franca of its traders. Central Asia has long been a region of migrations, of trade and exchange in goods and ideas, of mixing among peoples and cultures, of transience, sometimes great violence, and of impermanence. The once great civilisation of the Sogdians, whose power and influence had spanned continents, has passed into obscurity, just as Balasagun had vanished into dust.


Orthodox church, Karokol

Continuing eastwards, I reached the town of Karakol, founded by Russian settlers in the 1860s, close to the Chinese border, at the eastern end of Issyk-Kol Lake. It is a pleasant enough little town, with a bustling market and streets of single-story, wooden houses, painted white with ornate blue window frames. Karakol boasts an especially charming Orthodox Church, dating from the late-19th Century. Built of wood, its onion domes were destroyed by the Bolsheviks, who turned the building into a club. Now it is restored and returned to its original purpose, serving the dwindling Russian population.

But Karakol’s most extraordinary feature is the Dungan Mosque. Before the Bolsheviks, this was one of several mosques in Karakol, and it was the only one to survive their onslaught. It was built for the Dungan community, otherwise known as Hui, Muslims who migrated from China in the late 19th Century following rebellions against the Chinese. Numbering close to 60,000 in Kyrgyzstan according to the most recent census, they are also found in Kazakhstan and, in smaller numbers, in Russia. They speak a dialect of Mandarin, infused with Arabic, Persian and Turkic words. Indeed, although physiologically they appear Chinese, they are thought to be descendants of the medieval Arab conquerors who first brought Islam to the region. There are still a number of Dungan villages, near Karakol and Bishkek, where they have maintained their distinctive traditions.


Dungan mosque, Karakol

Standing in front of the mosque in Karakol, I was initially confused. Before me was what looked very much like a pagoda, the architecture purely Chinese, until I noticed the squat little minaret to one side. The interior, with its spread prayer carpets, appears more identifiably Muslim. What an astonishing blend of different styles and civilisations, Muslim and Chinese. But in its way it is quintessentially Central Asian, a product of the toing and froing from east to west and back that characterised the Silk Road for centuries, exchanging ideas and technologies, combining them in novel ways. For the purist Muslim zealots of Saudi Arabia, the vandals of Timbuktu, Karakol’s Dungan Mosque would no doubt be an impossible affront. Yet this mosque appeared to be a glorious expression of the globalisation and multi-culturism of the Silk Road long before such terms had been invented.

Since time immemorial, the nomadic Kyrgyz have set off every summer with their animals to the high summer pastures. Even amid the urban living of the 21st century, some still leave their villages to spend the summer months in these jailoos, living in yurts, the traditional felt-covered tents of the Central Asian nomads. Taking to the mountains around Karakol, I got a foretaste of this summer migration, at the hot springs of Altyn Arashan and in the Jeti-Oguz (Seven Bulls) gorge, and the Valley of Flowers. In serene landscapes, families go about their business, tending sheep, and making kymys, the extremely sour fermented mare’s milk that the Kygyz value highly, but which to me is only just barely palatable.

Increasingly, the traditional life of the Kyrgyz is being overtaken, not only by modern living, but by the beginnings of mass tourism, and the commercialism it brings. Some of the shepherds in the summer pastures now supplement their incomes by putting up visitors in one of their yurts, offering them food and traditional hospitality. In the little town of Kochkor, just to the west of Issyk-Kol, this seems particularly visible. Westerners, with their hiking boots and ruck sacks, stride through the bazaar, or lounge outside the little café which has been adopted as their favoured drinking spot. Their numbers are not great for now, and Kyrgyzstan is still a destination for the somewhat adventurous. But they will certainly increase, and the facilities on offer for them will become more elaborate, more comfortable.


Song-Kol

Kochkor is the main jump-off point for visits to Song-Kol lake, perhaps the greatest jewel of Kyrgyzstan, a little over 3,000 metres above sea level, the most breath-taking of the jailoos. For now, no tarmacked roads lead there, and there are only one or two derelict buildings dating from the Soviet era. Well away from civilisation, families spend the summer in their yurts, tend their animals, collect water from the lake, and carry out their ablutions in little basins fed by water from a small tank above. Behind each little group of yurts, a small shed stands over a deep hole in the ground, and patches of brown grass around it reveal where previous years’ latrines have been filled in. Chickens and turkeys run about the little encampments, while horses and cattle wander the meadows around the lake, the horses often hobbled by short ropes tied around their legs, preventing them from moving far. In one small area, about a dozen family encampments are grouped together, with signs on their yurts indicating which travel company they are connected with. In this yurt camp, a few dozen foreign tourists and their guides are put up, fed traditional dishes such as laghman, a broth of noodles, mutton and a variety of vegetables, or plov. Sitting on felt mats at a low table, the hostess attends with a pot of tea, from which she repeatedly refills the little bowls of the guests. In one yurt, I initially made the mistake of sitting opposite my companions, with my back to the door. I was gently told by my guide that, as a foreign guest, I should sit on the other side of the table, facing the door, as was traditional for honoured guests.


Song-Kol

Walking along the shore of Song-Kol, away from the yurt camp, I have a sense of timelessness, of wandering in a wilderness unchanged over centuries. Meadows surround the lake, wreathed by snowy mountains beyond. A great variety of birds flutter and skip across the water, some of them diving in after the abundant fish. In the last light of evening and the first light of dawn, I tread quietly among the little humps of earth close to the water’s edge, pock-marked with mouse burrows, trying to approach the eagles as they stand and wait, before soaring into the air, flying low over the burrows, spying out the mice that are their prey. As I sit at the lake’s edge, a girl rides down to water her horse a few yards away from me, offering a “salam” as greeting, then leaning in her saddle as the horse lowers his head to slurp in his evening drink. In this country, children take to a horse at a very young age, and I saw boys of six or seven cantering along with full confidence and control over their mounts, riding bear-back, their legs too short to reach a stirrup.


Song-Kol

The next morning, it was my turn to mount a horse, for the first time in my life, not counting occasions when, as a child, I had ridden a pony led by a man walking in front. Not to worry, I had been assured, I would have a very calm horse that would just follow the horse of my guide, riding in front. And for the most part, it was true. My guide’s horse, however, was far more unruly, repeatedly trying to veer off, or refusing to budge, the guide responding with sharp whacks with his whip to the horse’s haunches or neck. This was unsettling for my horse, as well as for me, and I was happy to hang back. Occasionally, my horse too dug in his hooves and refused to move, but for the most part he was content quietly to amble along, choosing a path with which he was well familiar. My guide said the horse was happy to have a tourist on his back, who would not hit him hard, and who would let him get away with his transgressions. I wasn’t sure the horse had a favourable opinion of me. Kyrgyz horses are used to being hit hard, and he probably thought I was weak. But I became used to him, and perhaps he became used to me.

Horses are central to the culture of the Kyrgyz, nomads until only a few generations ago. I was a little perturbed at the readiness I sometimes saw to beat them without mercy. At Altyn Arashan, I watched a young man on horseback as he tried to round up a couple of unwilling horses, who were possibly also confused as to what he wanted them to do. When he finally got them where he wanted them, he dismounted and beat them both savagely and gratuitously with his rope. My guide at Song-Kol told me he would prefer not to have to hit a horse, but that it was necessary to show who was boss.

Beginning my trek alongside the lake, after lunch in a yurt along the way, we turned up towards a mountain pass, following a stream past yurt encampments, with their grazing horses and sheep, and children at play. It was an idyllic scene, and, I felt, in this country there was no better way to see it than from the back of a horse, gently rocking to and fro as we climbed up to the top of the pass.

Arriving at the top, I was in for a shock, Looking down the other side, the path appeared alarmingly steep. My guide assured me it would not be a problem. No doubt he found my trepidation feeble. Probably any Kyrgyz child would not have given it a second thought. Setting off gingerly on the descent, my horse, probably sensing my discomfort, was as reluctant as I. Both horses tended to slip and slide on the loose, gravelly rocks on the steep slope. They always recovered their footing, but, unsettled, I said I would rather dismount and descend the steep sections on my own feet, leading my horse. Reluctantly the guide agreed. It was only my first day in the saddle, and maybe I would have become accustomed to such steep slopes in time. I watched impressed as Kyrgyz men almost ran their mounts down nearly sheer inclines. The following day, I rode down a similarly steep slope, not without fear, but I did it.


A yurt camp

By the end of the second day, if it were not for the mounting pain in my knees, I was starting to feel at ease, as we followed the mountain paths, up and down, from one valley to the next, my horse generally obeying my commands by now. As we rode across a final meadow at the end of the trek, we passed a couple of local men setting off with supplies strung over the sides of their steeds. As my guide stopped to chat with them, the horse of one of them suddenly, without warning, dropped to its haunches, his rider maintaining his seat on its back. “Oh yes, they sometimes do that”, my guide said.

Although I intended to head farther south, for Osh, the absence of any regular public transport meant I had to return, with my driver, first to Bishkek. There are several daily flights from Bishkek to Osh, Kyrgyzstan’s second city, but I wanted to travel overland. There were no public buses or minibuses. Other than by airplane, the only way to make the journey was in a private, shared taxi. I arrived at the place from where taxis departed for Osh at about 6 am the following morning. There were three or four taxis waiting to fill all their places before setting off. So I waited. By 8.30, I was beginning to wonder whether we would ever get away. Could it be possible that so few people wished to travel from the capital to the country’s second city? The north-south divide is frequently cited as one of Kyrgyzstan’s biggest problems. Indeed, what does it say about a country when there are no regular buses between its two most important cities? Most people would not be able to afford the price of an air ticket. Yet no one, not even the government, had thought it necessary or desirable to ensure regular transport links between the capital and the southern provinces, including Jalal Abad and Osh.

After a while, I noticed that in each of the taxis waiting to depart for Osh there were one or two passengers. There was no taxi-rank system, filling up one car at a time. So I suggested that four of us should combine and all get into one taxi. The drivers themselves would never suggest this, I was told, as they would not poach each other’s passengers. But when initiative came from the passengers themselves, there were no objections. Ten minutes later we were on our way.

It is a long, ten-hour journey, the road following a twisting route over mountain passes, looping well to the west, before heading back eastwards along the Uzbekistan border, through Jalal Abad, and finally down to Osh. Setting out along the built-up plain west of Bishkek, the journey begins in the most developed part of the country, before heading south, up into the Alatau mountain range. Before reaching the mountains, close to the town of Kara-Balta, the road passes a big new oil refinery, still under construction, a huge sign in Chinese characters outside, and numerous Chinese workers in identical red overalls beetling away around it. This may be the future for Kyrgyzstan. Beijing is also investing in other major infrastructure projects, including a railway from China to Uzbekistan, across Kyrgyz territory, and a north-south power line, linking the hydroelectric plant at Jalal Abad with the energy poor north of the country. Numerous Sino-Kyrgyz joint ventures have been established in recent years, and Chinese traders increasingly make their presence felt in Kyrgyz markets.

Many Kyrgyz have mixed feelings about all this. Suspicion and antipathy towards Chinese is widespread. Many want the prosperity they hope Chinese investment may bring, but fear being swamped by their vast eastern neighbour. And, aware of the environmental degradation that has accompanied China’s economic growth, they fear the despoliation of the beautiful nature of their land. Surveying the magnificent landscape of Song-Kol, my guide had told me the Kyrgyz would try to protect its pristine beauty. But he was anxious. A young man in Karakol, close by the Chinese border, told me there were, as yet, few Chinese in the region, and he hoped it would remain that way. Daniar, my guide at Altyn Arashan, above Karakol, thought it was better for Kyrgyzstan to maintain its key relationship with Russia, which he saw as less of a threat. I was not sure it represented such an opportunity as China either.

Heading up into the mountains, via a long tunnel, the road goes over the Tor-Ashuu Pass. In many places prone to avalanches the road is shielded by concrete shelters against the winter snow. Yet I am told the road is often impassable during winter, adding to the isolation of north and south. On my return journey, we had to wait in a long queue of vehicles at the entrance to the tunnel, because some cattle were being herded through it. And this was the main north-south artery of the country. Beyond the pass the road proceeds westwards through a long valley, bordered with yurts at frequent intervals, some of them inhabited by shepherds, others selling kymys, food and other products to passers-by. After traversing another mountain pass, the road descends, around the Toktogul reservoir, before turning eastwards for Jalal Abad and Osh.

Here, beyond the mountains, we entered a different world from northern and central Kyrgyzstan, the world of the Fergana Valley, with gentle rolling hills, and a hot, sultry climate. Fergana, with its diverse ethnic make-up, had long had a distinct identity. Then the Bolsheviks divided it up arbitrarily among three Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, their territories coiling around each other in an awkward and nonsensical carve-up. Some think it was a deliberate policy on the part of Moscow, to divide and rule. Perhaps it did not matter so much when they were all republics of one country, under one imperial authority. But as in so many other examples of botched decolonisation, independence and separation brought to the surface all the underlying tensions that too often afflict multi-ethnic regions.

Some writers downplay the distinctiveness of the Central Asian nations, seeing them as modern constructs forged by the Bolsheviks out of disparate tribes which had previously had no sense of national identity. Colin Thubron, in his account of his travels through the region, Shadow of the Silk Road, writes that the Kyrgyz nation-state was “the gift of Stalin”. It was the Soviets who drew its boundaries, and standardised the Kyrgyz language, taking care to differentiate it from its close Kazakh relative. And it was Russians who promoted the compilation of the Manas epic out of the oral tradition of the Kyrgyz nomads, to buttress the Kyrgyz national identity. Of course, there is much truth in this, in the notion that modern nations are constructs, or “imagined communities”, in the phrase dreamed up by political scientists. The historical accuracy of the official story of Manas is much in doubt. Early versions were changed in the Soviet period to portray Manas as Kyrgyz, rather than Nogay.

But if the Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Uzbek nations are modern constructs, is that not equally true of hundreds of nations the world over? However or whenever nations are formed, if its members are convinced of their identity, can any one nation be counted as either more or less valid than any other? Is this not as true for Kyrgyz as it is for Macedonians, Montenegrins, Ukrainians. Palestinians or Kurds, all of whose claims to nationhood have been denied by others? The origins of nations, the development of their nation-founding myths, are interesting subjects for academic study, for sure. But it should not be overlooked that every nation, including those that consider themselves the oldest and most venerable, has its myths. That the development of national identities has in some cases been recent, and that the identities of some groups of people even today are not settled, still disputed by their putative members, is a matter of interest. But it should not be a reason to dismiss the claim of any who say “we are Macedonians” or “we are Kyrgyz”. This is a matter of practical sense as well as the recognition of peoples’ national rights. In the Fergana Valley, the differences between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks have been sufficiently strongly felt as to cause bitter and bloody conflict since the end of the Soviet Union.


Medieval mausoleums, Özgön

I visited Özgön, a small Uzbek-majority town on the road between Jalal Abad and Osh. Özgön has an ancient pedigree, having been, like Balasagun in the north, an important centre of the medieval Karakhanids. Unlike Balasagun, a trace of the medieval splendour of Özgön remains. An 11th century minaret and three mausoleums, joined together in one building, are well preserved, and faced with fine ornamental brickwork. Unfortunately, Özgön is better known today for the inter-communal violence which in 1990 pitted crudely armed local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz against each other, resulting in hundreds of casualties.

Strolling through the town’s bazaar today, all appears calm and normal on the surface. Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are said to differ from each other physically, although they speak closely related Turkic languages. In general, Uzbeks’ appearance retains more of the pre-Turkic Indo-European, Iranian inheritance than the Kyrgyz. In addition, dress can give clues, Uzbek men preferring small skull caps, often green, rather than the tall felt hats sported by many Kyrgyz men. But I could not reliably distinguish between the two peoples. After generations living in close prosperity, united by their Muslim faith and the closeness of their local dialects, the differences must surely have been eroded by inter-marriage. Probably those differences are more apparent to locals. But nevertheless, the town and its people did look different to the places I had visited in northern and central Kyrgyzstan. Willowy women with fair complexions and sandy coloured hair peeping out from beneath their veils ambled through the streets.

Osh boasts a history stretching back more than two millennia. None of that can be seen today in the grid-like street pattern of a Soviet-era city. The town is dominated by a long rocky ridge known as Solomon’s Throne, a place of pilgrimage for Muslims, but also infused with pagan beliefs and rituals that probably pre-date the arrival of Islam in the region. At one end of the ridge stands a little mosque, built into the rock, originally constructed in the 15th century, and rebuilt in the 19th century and again following the end of communism. All along the ridge are holy places, caves, hollows, smooth rocks, which draw pilgrims hopeful of blessings, cures, and who knows what other miracles? The ridge itself, viewed from a certain angle, is said to resemble a reclining pregnant woman, and is a particular draw for prospective mothers. I paused before a narrow aperture in a rock, watching as women thrust their arms deep into it. One of them cajoled a little girl to do likewise. It seemed hardly surprising that she was reluctant to put her arm into a dark hole, but she eventually complied. Young people queued to do likewise. What is the significance of this hole? I did not know, but I gave it a go. I watched with curiosity as women slid down a gently sloping rock, smoothed away by countless others over the ages. They laughed as they did so. But what meaning did it have beyond innocent fun? Money had been placed in little niches in the rocks, blackened by candles. What were these offerings for?

Colin Thubron had described a visit to such a place, a mazar near Kochkor. He was given a tour by an Imam, who explained the magic of the place, the miracles that occurred there. Islam had put down shallow roots among the Kyrgyz, nomads whose traditional folk beliefs lingered, even under godless communism. Something similar can be found in South America, among the nominally Catholic peasants of the Andes who put a Christian gloss on older animist beliefs, and continue to make offerings to the Pachamama. And in the whirling suns, miraculous cures and rosaries turned to gold of Marian shrines in Europe. It is perhaps harmless enough. But nowadays a rigid conformity with the supposedly pure Islamic Orthodoxy of the Arabian peninsula is intolerant of the local cultural accretions of far-flung Muslim lands from Timbuktu to Indonesia. In such a world, where is the place for the mysticism and magic of places like Solomon’s Throne? Below the ridge is a large new mosque, built with donations from I don’t know where. What does the Islamic establishment make of the pagan pieties performed by Muslim pilgrims on the hill above?

Another feature distinguishing Osh and Özgön from the north of the country is the more overt devoutness of many of the people, even younger women more often going veiled, men wearing skull caps. This is in large part down to the Uzbeks, who according to the 2009 census made up almost half of Osh’s population, and who have long tended to be more strictly observant than their Kyrgyz neighbours. Although I was journeying through Kyrgyzstan during Ramadan, I had seen little sign of it. In so many little grocery stores, the main item on sale, sometimes taking up a whole wall of shelves behind the counter, was vodka, in a bewildering variety of brands. The Kyrgyz family with whom I stayed in Osh did not observe the fast at all until the last evening of my stay, when they invited a large party of people, men and women seated separately, to share the post-fast feast, commencing with prayers. One of the daughters of the household, like her mother and sisters dressed in modern, western clothes, explained that it was traditional to invite others during Ramadan.


Osh market

Strolling through the bazaar in Osh, as in Özgön, all is outwardly calm. Uzbek and Kyrgyz appear to go about their business as normal. Perhaps the most pertinent difference between the two peoples is that, whereas the Kyrgyz were until relatively recently nomads, the Uzbeks had been settled. It was Uzbeks who had made up much of the urban population, including Osh, where they dominated commercial life. In recent decades, this had sparked resentment among Kyrgyz, who had moved in from rural areas in increasing numbers, but often found it hard to find work. Matters came to a head following the ouster of Bakiyev in April 2010. Bakiyev was a southerner. Many southern Kyrgyz saw his removal as a northern ploy to weaken their position, while Uzbeks in the south had often seen Bakiyev as favouring the Kyrgyz. The tensions peaked with clashes in Osh and Jalal Abad in June 2010, leading to anti-Uzbek pogroms as Kyrgyz poured in from the surrounding countryside to join in the attacks. Hundreds were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced, both within Kyrgyzstan and over the border into Uzbekistan. Thousands of houses and businesses were burned.

Numerous reports of complicity by Kyrgyzstan’s security forces in the attacks on Uzbek neighbourhoods in Osh were confirmed in a report by an Independent International Commission of Inquiry. While the report refuted claims that the events amounted to genocide, it did point to grave crimes against humanity. It infuriated the interim government in Bishkek. However, events since June 2010 suggest that Bishkek’s control in the south has become tenuous. The nationalist mayor of Osh, who came to prominence during the violence, has assertively championed Kyrgyz dominance, openly telling Uzbeks to accept a subordinate position. Several reports, including one by the International Crisis Group, have told how Uzbeks have been victimised by the police, subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture and extortion, with bribes sought for the release of detained young men. They have also pointed to tight links between the authorities in the south, the police and organised crime in a transit region for drugs from Afghanistan.

The Bishkek authorities have done nothing to address, or even to acknowledge the grievances of the Uzbeks, or to counter the narrative peddled by the Osh mayor that the Uzbeks were separatists who had brought their troubles upon themselves. While the large majority of victims in the violence were Uzbeks, most of those who have been arrested and charged in connection with it have also been Uzbeks. There is a dearth of Kyrgyz in the south willing to challenge the mayor’s the mayor’s version of events. An elderly Kyrgyz former policeman I spoke to in Osh told me “the Uzbeks had started to live well, and so we fired their houses; you understand, we fired their houses.” Facing hostile local authorities and an unsympathetic Kyrgyz public in the south, and indifference and powerlessness from Bishkek, southern Uzbeks have withdrawn into themselves, increasingly turning to the Islamic faith for succour. Despite the apparent calm, the festering conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks threatens to boil up again unless the central government begins to get a grip.

Wednesday, 22 August 2012

A celebratory election in Libya

It was a day of celebration. Driving through the streets of Tripoli, we passed numerous checkpoints, some manned by official security forces, others by the revolutionary brigades, which have yet to be disbanded, incorporated into the military or brought under government control. Our driver, himself a former revolutionary who had been wounded in the struggle, flashed victory “V” signs and shouted “Allahu Akbar!”, and we were waved through. At the polling stations too, a festive atmosphere prevailed. Loudspeakers blared out chants of “Allahu Akbar!” Voters queued patiently and happily, some of the men punching the air in elation, with more cries of “Allahu Akbar!” One old man, almost overcome with emotion, told us in his broken English that he had last voted in 1964, in the time of King Idriss, and he was very happy to have the chance to vote again in his lifetime.

The voting and counting completed, there was an explosion of joy. A convoy of vehicles, security and international observers, accompanied the truck racing around the streets from polling centre to polling centre, picking up the packed and sealed ballot boxes. At each centre there was a party atmosphere, women dancing and ululating, men shouting with even greater vigour, “Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!” It did not seem to matter so much who had won. That was of secondary importance. The victory was that an election had been held at all, the crowning achievement of the revolution that had toppled Muammar Gaddafi only a few months before. It takes a country that has experienced decades of dictatorship really to appreciate the value of holding an election, something of which people in the jaded, cynical west too often lose sight.


Gaddafi's ruined residence

There is a special atmosphere in a post-revolutionary country: fervour, optimism, belief. Things are different now, I heard again and again. Libyans are free. Free to mock the former ruler and his family openly; the bottled up taunts expressed in art and humour in the graffiti, some of it highly creative, that plastered the walls of the capital. Free to speak openly about the new would-be leaders competing in the elections. Women felt free as never before, determined to assert their rights, to play their part in the emerging new country. This was their chance. Forget stereotypes of the supposed conservatism of the Arab world. Libyans had fought for their rights, and through these elections they were determined to enshrine them. And women were not going to be left out.

Tripoli graffiti

But as in most revolutions there is also a downside, an underbelly of vengefulness against those accused of supporting the former regime. In some cases the vengefulness was collective, directed against whole towns, tribes or ethnic groups. Black African migrants from countries to the south, many of whom had lived and worked in Libya for years, accused en-masse of having been mercenaries for Gaddafi. And perhaps saddest of all, the people of Tawergha, also black, from a town close to the city of Misrata, heartland of the revolution’s most ardent supporters, and the most powerful of all the brigades to emerge from the revolution. The Misrata had driven the Tawergha from their homes, scattering them around Libya and abroad, hunting down Tawergha men, torturing and summarily executing them. They accused them collectively of supporting Gaddafi and of the most heinous crimes, including mass rape, so emotive in a traditional, patriarchal society. No matter that no hard evidence of mass crimes on such a scale has been forthcoming. I saw a young Libyan former revolutionary reduced to tears talking about the Tawergha, who in his eyes were guilty of the worst crimes of the Gaddafi regime. Another young Libyan praised Britain for the lack of racism he had found there. When I pointed out the rampant racism towards black Africans in Libya, he looked startled for a moment, and then “oh but Peter, that is different, let me explain why we hate them…”

For all the remarkable progress and extraordinary success of the first elections, Libya has yet to become a normal, stable country. The brigades remain far too powerful, even in Tripoli, where their anti-aircraft gun-mounted pick-ups still race around and break-neck speed, setting up roadblocks and sometimes fighting gun battles. Even in the capital their presence undermines the new authorities. In some other parts, the rule of law does not exist and the government’s writ does not run. Unless the Tawergha can be safe from their vigilante persecutors, the revolution will not have brought the freedom from oppression it aspired to. Holding an election might just have been the critical step in passing from revolutionary fervour and excess to a democratic, truly free Libya.

Friday, 8 June 2012

A religious festival in Split

I arrived back in Split a couple of days before the feast of St. Domnius, St. Duje in Croatian, the patron saint of Split. St. Duje, who hailed from Antioch, was bishop of Salona, the capital of Roman Dalmatia, just inland from present day Split. He was martyred in AD 304, during the persecution of Christians under the Emperor Diocletian. Diocletian was himself Dalmatian, and is believed to have come from near Salona. The only Roman Emperor to abdicate, he retired to Dalmatia, and his retirement palace later formed the nucleus of Split.

The ruins of Salona today are hemmed in by the encroachment of Split and the coastal highway. Sacked by Slav and Avar invaders in the early 7th century, some of the inhabitants sought refuge within the walls of Diocletian’s palace, and in time Split spread out from there. Among the ruins in Salona are graves of early Christian martyrs. While St. Duje fell victim to Diocletian’s persecution, the former Emperor’s mausoleum was later converted into the cathedral of St. Duje in Split.

For the feast of St. Duje on 7 May, the riva, the seafront in Split, was packed with stalls selling traditional crafts. In the evening there was a pop concert. The main event was supposed to be a religious service in the morning, although it was in fact not especially well attended. A few hundred people gathered in front of the stage, but many others just sat outside the cafés or milled around the stalls.

I listened to the sermon, which was given by one of the Dalmatian bishops. I was already used to the practice in Croatia of infusing religious observances with rabid nationalism, but I had not expected such an outpouring of nationalist fervour in a church feast more than 15 years after the end of the war. The bishop appeared to be carried away with euphoria and ecstasy as he spoke in Dalmatian dialect about the defence of the Croatian language and the Croat identity. His father was a Croat, his mother was a Croat, “and I am of their blood, a faithful Croatian son”. Any religious content was secondary, a mere afterthought. He concluded with a call to “love of God, love of man, love of homeland”. The content and the whole tone of his sermon was focused above all on the last of those three loves, and there was no doubt where the main stress lay. The bishop’s religion had little to do with Christianity. The universal nature of the Catholic religion was not present. Christianity was a mere veneer for his real religion, the religion in which he passionately believed, a pagan religion, centred on worship of the nation.

The bishop bewailed the fact that the feast day was not a state holiday, noting that in times gone by the calendar was stuffed with religious holidays, but that now a holiday for St. Duje could not be found in this “so-called progressive state”. There is the rub, of course. The Catholic Church in Croatia is thoroughly alienated from the modern, secular world. Still wedded to a world of yesteryear, when faithful sons and daughters of the nation flocked to village churches in traditional, national costumes, it frowns upon the very notion of progressiveness. In the evening, young people came out in much greater numbers to listen to the pop concert. Probably he would be appalled. For myself, I prefer progressive Croatia to his vision.

Wednesday, 6 June 2012

A visit to Imotski

From Sinj, I continued my journey southwards through the Dalmatian hinterland to Imotski, close to the border with Bosnia, tracing the footsteps of the 19th century British Egyptologist, J. Gardner Wilkinson. There being no direct bus route, I had to change buses at Split. Imotski is a small town, perched on a hill overlooking a large fertile plain, surrounded by the Dinaric mountains. The views are splendid, and the old town centre is attractive, built of the usual white limestone blocks.

Unlike Sinj, Imotski is rather isolated, with no highway linking it with the coast. It is rather a peripheral place. While the surrounding villages engage in agriculture, the town offers few opportunities. Young people sit around outside cafés. Many, no doubt, have left for more promising corners of the country. Imotski has had some famous sons, among them the poet Tin Ujević. But they didn’t stay there. I bought some locally-produced pršut (cured ham) from a shop in the town. The owner told me hopefully that a tunnel would be built through the mountains, linking Imotski to the coast, giving it a boost. For now, there was only one restaurant in the town, in the hotel where I stayed.


The Blue Lake, seen from the castle walls, Imotski

Imotski is famous for its two dramatic sink holes, the Blue Lake, and the Red Lake. These are typical features of limestone, karst regions. They were formed by the collapse of underground caves millions of years ago. The Blue Lake is in a wide, deep hole directly below the town castle. From one side of the castle, built atop a hill on the edge of the town, you look straight down into the lake, a considerable distance below. A zig-zag path leads down to the water’s edge. The lake is fed by several small streams, and the level of the water is said to vary considerably, sometimes disappearing altogether.

A short distance from the town, the Red Lake is named for the red colour of the cliffs that form the walls of the hole. It is one of the deepest sink holes in the world, a total of more than 500 metres. The nearly sheer cliffs make it impossible to descend to the water’s edge, but it is a spectacular sight. The lake is fed by an underground river whose origin and destination are unknown. It contains a unique type of fish which is also found in the rivers and streams in the plain below Imotski, hinting at the underground connections that link them.


The Red Lake, Imotski

Imotski was under Ottoman rule from the late 15th century until 1717, when it was captured by the Venetians. Gardner Wilkinson saw a stone in one of the walls recording that the castle had been restored by one Lubomir, said to have been a Bosnian prince before the Ottoman conquest. According to the local tradition, as related to Gardner Wilkinson, the castle had been captured by some 80 men, who had tricked the Ottoman garrison into believing they faced a much larger force by lighting numerous fires in the forests, prompting them to abandon the fort. Nothing remains of the town’s Muslim past.

Gardner Wilkinson was told how the Venetians, as a cruel form of sport, had offered condemned criminals the option of hurling themselves off the castle walls on to a ledge more than ten metres below. In the unlikely event that they succeeded, they would receive a pardon. Otherwise they plunged down the cliff into the Blue Lake.

Gardner Wilkinson found evidence of the former Muslim presence in the country around Imotski. In the village of Župa, he saw tombs with the crescent and star carved on them. At another village he saw tombs ‘apparently with the crescent and the cross rudely sculptured upon them…’. I had myself seen such a tomb with both cross and crescent in 1998, in a medieval graveyard near Stolac, across the border in Bosnia. The apparent confusion of Christian and Muslim symbols presumably dated from a period when people had publicly converted from one faith to the other, but were still hedging their bets. Several other tombs in the graveyard I visited near Stolac bore the typical markings of the Church of Bosnia, the heretical sect that took root in Bosnia in the Middle Ages, with their carved figures with outstretched, out-sized hands. Perhaps the ambiguity of the tomb with the cross and the crescent reflected the fact that this was a land of confused religious identities, where heresy had only briefly been supplanted by Catholic Orthodoxy before Islam appeared on the scene.

At Vrgorac, further south from Imotski, Gardner Wilkinson wrote of the ruined castle in terms that expressively reflected the attitude of his time to the drawn out conflict between Christianity and Islam in the region: ‘It was built in the days of terror, when the conquering Turks were spreading conquest and desolation over many Christian countries, and Dalmatia was trembling for its liberty and its faith…. It stands as a satisfactory memorial to the triumph of Christian over Moslem power; a still more singular proof of which is seen in the conversion of a minaret into the belfry of the church below.’ Yet under Ottoman rule Christianity had been tolerated, and although Christians were undoubtedly second-class subjects of the Sultan, they co-existed with Muslims. There were churches as well as mosques in Ottoman lands. As the Ottomans were rolled back in the 17th and 18th and most of the 19th centuries, Islam was simply effaced from the reconquered territories. Only in the last quarter of the 19th century, when Austria occupied Bosnia, did Christian Europe permit Muslims to remain in its midst.

Gardner Wilkinson was much interested in the Morlachs. He described at some length the manifold superstitions and folk beliefs of the Morlachs, including the measures they took to ward off vampires and witches. In Imotski, he witnessed a group of them, ‘simple-minded boors, with the usual long pigtails, loose brown jackets and blue tights’, claiming their rewards for killing wolves at the town hall, where they were ‘quizzed by the hat-wearing townsmen.’ At Župa, he was not altogether happy with the interest they showed in him: ‘Had it not been for the odious habit they have of making spitting part of their conversation, I might have been as much pleased with their visit as they seemed to be with mine… and their custom of abstaining from ablutions renders their near approach by no means desirable.’

Monday, 4 June 2012

Miracles and pageantry in Sinj

The town of Sinj is situated in the hinterland of the Dalmatian coast, among the hot white rocks of the Dinaric mountains. When the 19th century British travellers, J. Gardner Wilkinson and A.A. Paton visited Sinj, it was a remote and rather wild place. Nowadays it is a one-hour journey along the highway from Split.

Gardner Wilkinson made a round trip, travelling up the Krka river from Šibenik to Knin, then on to Sinj, and back to the coast at Split. He described the country around Sinj as highly primitive, noting the poor state of agriculture. He acknowledged, however, that the Austrians, who took over in Dalmatia following the Napoleonic Wars, had done something for the improvement of the region, notably through the founding of schools, in contrast to the neglect of the earlier Venetian rulers.

Gardner Wilkinson visited a market at Sinj, where he described seeing ‘blue-legged Morlacchi’ from the surrounding countryside, a reference to the leggings worn by the Morlachs. Visiting Sinj a few years later, Paton saw Morlachs dancing to a two-string gusla. There are different versions of the etymology of the name ‘Morlach’. One idea is that it comes from Greek, meaning ‘Black Vlachs’, while others suggest it comes from the Croatian ‘morski Vlasi’, ‘Sea Vlachs’. In either case, they were Vlachs.

In origin, the Vlachs were the Latinised, pre-Slav Illyrian population, who spoke a Romance language, akin to Romanian. While by the Middle Ages it seems that the Vlachs of Dalmatia had largely been linguistically assimilated by the Croats, they continued to be regarded as a quite distinct population almost until modern times. Their numbers were bolstered by waves of migration from the Ottoman lands in the 16th and 17th centuries. Complicating matters, the term was sometimes, in the twentieth century, used as a derogatory term for the primitive people of the Dalmatian hinterland, or for Serbs. Indeed, the Orthodox Vlachs of the Dalmatian interior, as well as north-west Bosnia, were assimilated by their co-religionists in the Serbian Orthodox Church from the 17th century. The Croatian political leader in the 1920s, Stjepan Radić, frequently blasted the Serbs as ‘Vlasi’. In 1993 I had an unpleasant meeting with a Croatian historian in Zagreb, a hard-line nationalist given a senior position by PresidentTudjman. He sought, by arguing that the Serbs of Croatia were not Serbs at all, but Vlachs, to demonstrate that there was no Serb minority in Croatia entitled to any rights as such.

Professor Sonia Bićanić told me how, having noticed that the olive groves on the island of Brać, where she had built a house, were being left un-harvested, was given as an explanation by a local woman, “there are no more Vlachs”. Apparently Vlachs had traditionally carried out such back-breaking seasonal labour. By the late 20th century Morlachs had virtually disappeared as a distinct group in Dalmatia. In the 1991 census, 22 people in Croatia declared themselves as Morlachs.


Statue of an Alkar, Sinj

Gardner Wilkinson attended the famous Sinjska Alka, an equestrian event held in the town each August to commemorate a victory over the Turks in 1715. Something between sporting event, pageant and national tradition, the Alka occupies a place in Croatia akin to the Oxbridge boat race in England. It is shown live on television, is attended by the highest state dignitaries, and has become a tourist attraction. Men in traditional, 18th century costumes, gallop down a narrow street through the town, wielding a lance with which they attempt to skewer a little metal ring, the ‘alka’, hanging overhead. The ring contains a central bull’s eye, which scores three points, and three outer segments, the top one of which scores two, and the lower two three points. Each rider makes three passes. Only men from the region of Sinj are allowed to take part. It is a great spectacle, although unlike Gardner Wilkinson, I have only watched it on a television set in Zagreb.

Sinj was part of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reverting to Venetian rule in the wars at the end of the seventeenth century. But that was not the end of the border wars with the Turks, and in 1715 there was an attempt by the Ottomans to retake the town. Credit for the victory in 1715 against the superior Ottoman force was given by the defenders to the intercession of the Virgin Mary. Pride of place in the Franciscan church in Sinj is given to an icon of the Virgin of Sinj. Thought to have been painted at the end of the sixteenth or beginning of the seventeenth century, the icon was brought by the Franciscans as they fled from Rama, in nearby Turkish-ruled Herzegovina, in 1687. The icon was placed in the church that was completed in 1714. As the Ottoman force attacked the following year, the icon was carried up to the small fortress on the hill above the church, where the defenders drew confidence from their belief in its miraculous powers.

The icon draws pilgrims in their thousands, especially on 15 August each year, when it is paraded through the town, carried aloft by members of the Alkar society in their regalia. The heavy metal doors of the Franciscan church depict the battle below Sinj fortress, with the Virgin Mary hovering above – a strikingly martial image for the doors of a church. The memory of the victory over the Turks, of the favour attributed to the Virgin Mary, and the pageantry of the Alka have combined to make Sinj an important symbol for Croatian nationalists since the 1990s, even if some look down their noses at the wild people of the Dinaric mountains, as they are still regarded by many of the sophisticates of Zagreb and the coastal cities.

In more recent times, the Alka was politicised, as Sinj became a centre of hardline Croatian nationalism, opposed to the presidency of Stipe Mesić. Mesić was elected following the death of the country’s founding president, Franjo Tudjman, at the end of 1999. He had been a close collaborator of Tudjman’s. He was the first Croatian prime minister following the election victory of Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in 1990, and went on to be Croatia’s last representative on the collective Yugoslav presidency. But Mesić later fell out with Tudjman, especially over the latter’s de facto alliance with Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević in the attempted carve up of Bosnia. By the time of his election as President in 2000, opponents of Tudjman’s authoritarianism saw Mesić as a breath of fresh air. But for the nationalist faithful of the HDZ, and for the wartime veterans’ lobby, Mesić was anathema.

Perhaps Mesić’s most significant act as president, taken in his first year in office, was to retire a group of generals who had signed an open letter complaining at what they saw as the mistreatment of veterans and the criminalisation of the war of independence. At issue was cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague (ICTY), as well as war crimes investigations being conducted in Croatia. In August 2000 a key war crimes witness was murdered, leading to a spate of arrests. Veterans’ groups responded with protests, and Mesić, as well as Prime Minister Ivica Račan, who had been Croatia’s last communist boss, received anonymous death threats.

In this context, the letter signed by 12 generals was seen as a challenge, and there was talk in the press that a coup was being planned. Although the atmosphere was tense, this seems unlikely. Nevertheless, Mesić’s resolute action in retiring the seven generals who were still serving sent a message that, in the post-Tudjman world, the country’s democratic institutions were sufficiently robust to withstand any such posturing.

Among the seven generals retired by Mesić was Ante Gotovina, widely lionised in Croatia as the hero of Operation Storm, by which swathes of Serb-controlled territory were recovered in 1995, and which included the widespread murder of Serb civilians, destruction of property, and the expulsion of most of the Serb population. Another was Mirko Norac, who had led a number of controversial military actions, including at Gospić early in the war, and the Medak Pocket in 1993, during which numerous atrocities against Serb civilians had been carried out. Norac was from a village near Sinj. He had attended school in Sinj. In 1994 he had been appointed Vojvoda, ‘Duke’, of the Sinj Alkars, a ceremonial title, and a great honour.

Norac was a local hero in Sinj. Despite clear evidence of his direct involvement in serious war crimes, he was repeatedly promoted during the war years. In Zagreb in 1998, a prominent Croatian journalist told me he and other journalists had seen a video recording which showed Norac personally murdering a Serb civilian at Gospić in 1991. This, he told me, had been brought to the attention of the ICTY. So why, he asked, did Norac remain at liberty? More than a hundred Serb civilians were murdered in cold blood at Gospić, in a planned and organised massacre in which Norac was one of the prime movers. Eventually Norac’s crimes caught up with him. Arrested in 2001 for his role at Gospić, he was in 2003 sentenced to 12 years in prison. In 2004 he was indicted, along with others, by the ICTY for the crimes committed in the Medak Pocket operation. He was transferred to The Hague, but the case was transferred back to the Croatian judicial system. Norac was sentenced to a further seven years. Some would say Norac was treated remarkably leniently given the seriousness of his crimes. In November 2011, he was released. The previous year President Ivo Josipović had stripped him of the rank of general.

In 1999 I met an elderly Serb gentleman from Gospić. He was one of those who had been taken from his home in 1991. He had escaped death, but, having moved away from Gospić for his and his family’s safety, his home had been taken over by somebody else. When I met him he was desperately trying to get his home back. As with all Serbs who had fled their homes, the Croatian authorities showed not a trace of sympathy. The plight of this entirely innocent man, whose flight was prompted by the murder of so many of his fellow Serb townsmen and women, was of no concern in a state which was at that point unwilling to allow any aspersion to be cast on the glorious Homeland War or its holy veterans. I don’t know what became of the man. I hope he was able to return and live out his last days in his own home.

In 2000 and subsequent years, as the net was beginning to close on Norac and some of his fellow wartime criminals, Mesić was an object of vilification for the veterans’ lobby. In Sinj there was a scandal, as the President was snubbed and whistled at at the Alka. Mesić condemned the politicisation of the event. After all, the Alka had been attended by earlier heads of whichever state Croatia had belonged to, from Austrian Emperors, to Tito, and latterly Tudjman. Things were patched up with the leaders of the Alkar society, but even at the last Alka of his presidency, in 2009, Mesić was again whistled at.

Staying in Sinj in the spring of 2012, I saw no outward sign of devotion to Norac. As everywhere in Dalmatia, there were posters proclaiming Gotovina as a hero. But there were none for Norac. Probably his crimes were simply too dreadful to be defended, the evidence of his guilt too conclusive. Unlike Gotovina, who had been convicted on the rather tenuous grounds of command responsibility, Norac’s involvement in war crimes was direct. And unlike Gotovina, who had been tried and sentenced in The Hague, Norac had been found guilty by a court in Croatia, lending his conviction a credibility that the ICTY has failed to acquire anywhere in ex-Yugoslavia.

Wednesday, 9 May 2012

Monasteries in Dalmatia

Visiting Šibenik in November 2011, I had hoped to follow in the footsteps of the 19th century English Egyptologist, J. Gardner Wilkinson, on a journey up the river Krka to the Visovac and Krka monasteries. Alas, how times had changed since his visit more than 150 years earlier. Gardner Wilkinson travelled by boat, and was treated as an honoured guest at the Franciscan friary at Visovac. Today, the area around the Krka is a national park, preserved and developed for tourism. Travel up and down the river depends on the timetable of tourist boats, and in November, out of the tourist season, they were not running.

The autumn was nonetheless a wonderful time to visit the falls at Skradinski Buk, reachable by bus from Šibenik, and a short walk down to the river. With very few tourists, I could stroll peacefully around the walkways, enjoying the spectacular cascades, framed by the autumnal colours of the surrounding trees. But I wanted to make the full trip, and to do it by boat.

So back again in the spring, this time I took the boat from the park entrance at the little town of Skradin, up to the falls at Skradinski Buk. The English architect, T.G. Jackson, made this journey in the 1880s. He described passing through a gorge “if possible still more sterile and white than any we had seen.” It is true that Dalmatia is notable for its barren landscape of bleached limestone mountains, and expanses of scrubby little bushes. Behind the exquisite towns of the coast, built from the same limestone rock, it is a hard, hot, unforgiving land. But the gorge to which Jackson referred is no longer sterile. The hills on either side are a mass of green trees, the river banks trimmed with reed beds, an occasional swan gliding among them. I had more than once heard Dalmatians complain that their region had been stripped of its trees during centuries of Venetian rule, the timber used for the Republic’s ships and the piles that formed the foundations of the city’s buildings, an early example of human-induced environmental degradation. If this were so, perhaps the forests along the banks of the Krka had had time to recover since the end of Venetian exploitation.

Skradinski Buk had a heavier flow of water than the previous autumn, the normal spring swell. This was despite the drought I had been told was afflicting much of Croatia. Another 19th century visitor to the falls was the Emperor Franz Josef, in 1875. His visit is commemorated by a notice next to a viewing point built out over the river by local people for the Emperor to view the falls. According to the notice, people thronged the surrounding hills, and greeted the Emperor by shooting their pistols in the air, with shouts of “Živio” – “Long life”!


Visovac Franciscan Friary

I took the tourist boat up to Visovac. The friary, on an island in the middle of the river, surrounded by cypress trees, is an idyllic scene. Unlike in Gardner Wilkinson’s day, when a foreign visitor was rare and feted, nowadays the friars generally stay out of the way of the tourists and pilgrims that pour over the island. Founded in the 14th century as an Augustinian monastery, the monks fled the encroaching Turks. In the 15th century, Franciscans moved in from Bosnia, where the order was specially favoured by the Ottoman rulers, and licensed by them to minister to their Catholic subjects.

Today, the friary serves as a seminary, housing three friars and nine seminarians at the time of my visit. During the 1990s conflict, the friary was close to the front line. Our guide told us that shells fell in the surrounding area, and even on the friary itself, and that the seminarians were removed to a safer place, on the coast.

Housed in the friary is a small museum. The walls of one room are covered with photographs of Catholic churches damaged and ruined during the war. The guide gave us his potted history of the war: in 1991 the Serbs attacked Slovenia and then Croatia; in 1992 they attacked Bosnia; and half of Bosnia is still occupied by the Serbs. It is a partial description. The walls contain no pictures of ruined Orthodox churches or mosques. There is nothing about the Serbs from the Dalmatian hinterland driven out in 1995, their homes destroyed or occupied by Croats to prevent them from ever returning. Nor about the hundreds of Serb civilians murdered in the aftermath of the Croat reconquest of Serb-controlled territory. The mention of Serb ‘occupation’ of half of Bosnia omits reference to Croatia’s participation in the attempted carve-up of Bosnia with the Serbs, in which some Herzegovinian Franciscans were implicated. Nothing about the wanton destruction of the old town of Stolac in southern Herzegovina, its Muslim population expelled, the town wrecked, not in any fighting, for there was none in Stolac, but in an attempt by its wartime Croat occupiers to expunge all evidence of its Ottoman, oriental past, and of its Muslim population.

This is so typical of Catholic Croats, as well as of Orthodox Serbs, all of their focus on the sufferings of their own people, the damage to their churches, the Golgotha of their nation, and no acknowledgement of the sufferings, the injustices against others. In all their Christian charity, there is no time or space for others.

Yet the Visovac museum also contains an exhibit which hints at a time when relations among Catholics and Orthodox in the Dalmatian hinterland were not as fraught as they became in the 20th century. The exhibit in question is the sword of Vuk Mandušić, a local 17th century hero who fought against the Turks. Mandušić is one of the characters in the epic poem, The Mountain Wreath, by the Montenegrin poet and Prince-Bishop, Petar Petrušić Njegoš, and is a favourite of Serb epic poetry. Mandušić was Orthodox, which in 21st century Dalmatia would make him a Serb. Indeed, today his legacy is celebrated by wild-eyed Serb nationalist guslar players, wailing out their violent diatribes accompanied by the tuneless one-string instrument. Yet in the 17th century he could be a hero to Catholics and Orthodox believers alike. Was he a Serb or a Croat hero? In his day the question would have been irrelevant. For the more sophisticated population of the coast, he would have been a Vlach, or Morlach, as most of the population of the wild interior were identified. Yet the sword, and the memory, of this Orthodox slayer of Turks has been preserved in a Catholic friary.

Gardner Wilkinson continued his journey by boat up the Krka. From Visovac, boats could only go as far as the Roški slap waterfalls, and in order for him to continue from there it was necessary to send ahead to the Orthodox monastery of Michael the Archangel to ask them to send a boat to the other side of the falls. According to Gardner Wilkinson’s account, this presented the Visovac friars with a dilemma. They were not in the habit of communicating with the Orthodox monastery, and were concerned not to open themselves to the possibility of an affront. But one of the friars recalled that the ‘Greeks’ had been very civil on a past occasion, and that a letter to them might initiate friendly relations. So Gardner Wilkinson was able to proceed on his journey.

He found the Orthodox monks to be as hospitable as the Franciscans, and described the archimandrite as having the ‘manners of a gentleman educated in Europe.’ He noted that, whereas in the Catholic religious houses there were pictures of the Austrian emperor, the pope etc., in the Orthodox monastery it was the Russian emperor who adorned the walls. As the Ottoman Empire retreated, Austria set itself up as the protector of the Catholics of the Balkans, whereas Russia played the same role for the Orthodox. Thus political and national identities were drawn on religious lines, between Serbs and Croats, and wider conflicts between the empires of Europe imprinted themselves on the Balkan region.

For the modern traveller there was no possibility of staying at either monastery, as Gardner Wilkinson had done. And the timetable of the tourist boats did not permit a continuation by boat up to the Orthodox monastery. So I took the bus from Šibenik to Knin, and from there travelled by train to the little town of Kistanje, a couple of miles walk from the monastery.


A forlorn railway station, near Kistanje

The journey to Kistanje was a sad affair. Seventeen years after the war, and the flight or expulsion of most of the Serbs of the region, it had still not recovered. When I first travelled through the Knin region, not long after the end of the conflict, it was a desolate landscape, scarred with ruined houses, burnt out by people determined to empty the territory of Serbs forever. Knin itself had to some extent come back to life, its departed Serbs partially replaced by incoming Bosnian Croats. An American international official who had worked in Knin for the UN during the war, and returned there a few years later with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said the experience of returning reminded her of the film “Invasion of the Body Snatchers”. The town was the same, but the people were different. But the surrounding villages have been left half-empty, bereft, some elderly Serbs returning to live out their last days on their own land, but few young. Railway stations along the line to Kistanje were gutted, fallen down, still in use – trains still stopped there, but apparently not worth repairing.

Kistanje had seen some redevelopment. After the conflict, the Croatian authorities settled Croats from Janjevo, in Kosovo, in Kistanje, occupying Serb-owned houses. In an effort to promote Serb return, the US embassy in the late 1990s financed the building of new homes for some of the Janjevo Croats, in order to free up Serb-owned homes for returnees. There has also been some renovation of civic buildings in the town centre.

A brash new Catholic Church with a tall tower has been built in this formerly almost entirely Serb town. The tower reminded me of the tall tower on a new Catholic church in Mostar, close to the former frontline between Bosniac east and Croat west. Such a tower in an ethnically divided land makes a statement; that this town is Croat. Round the corner from the church in Kistanje sits an older, more serene Orthodox church. Some Serbs have returned, although there is precious little employment for them. And ruined buildings in the very centre of the town are testimony to the fact that the place is essentially still a wreck.

The walk to the monastery was tougher than I had expected. It was only the beginning of May, but the temperature was already baking hot, and the sparse, scrubby little bushes offered practically no protection against the sun. But as the road descends towards the Krka, the river appears, snaking between the tree-covered hills, and then the monastery, sitting close to the bank of the river on one side, and a large, green pond on another. It is an idyllic setting. The monastery dates to the 14th Century, when it was endowed by Jelena, sister of the Serbian Emperor Stefan Dušan, who was married to a local nobleman.


Orthodox Monastery of Michael the Archangel, Krka

The monastery was in the Serb-held para-state of Krajina during the recent conflict. Following Operation Storm, by which Croatia reclaimed the Serb-controlled territory and drove out most of its Serb inhabitants, the monastery was ransacked. Important documents were lost, one of the monks told me. There has since been considerable renovation, mainly financed by the Serb diaspora, the monk told me, with contributions also from the Serbian government and, he somewhat grudgingly acknowledged, from the Croatian government. It is now in a fine state, although some renovation work remains to be undertaken. It also houses a school. The monk spoke sadly of the near-empty villages in the surrounding area, the burned houses, the lack of young people.

I mentioned the visit Gardner Wilkinson had made 150 years before. Among the graves in a little graveyard just outside the monastery walls were some from the decades after Gardner Wilkinson’s visit. I stood in front of one of them, wondering whether this was the archimandrite Gardner Wilkinson had met. I told how the Franciscans at Visovac and the Orthodox monks had cooperated to help Gardner Wilkinson on his journey, and noted the apparently friendly relations that had existed between the two religious houses at that time. The monk replied that up until the Second World War relations had indeed been ‘correct’. But since then they had been harmed by the genocide committed during that war against the Serb people under the Croatian fascist Ustaša regime, in which, he asserted, some Catholic priests had participated. They had never apologised, and they had never acknowledged what had happened, he said.

A young pupil from the monastery school interjected that every Serb in that region had relatives who had been killed during the Second World War. He claimed that one million had been murdered at the Ustaša death camp at Jasenovac. My heart sank as I listened to this. While the depredations of the murderous Ustaša were a fact, the massively inflated numbers that so many Serbs persist in claiming only detract from their case and alienate those Croats who would naturally be inclined to sympathise. The more usual claim had been 700,000, but why not round it up to a cool million, after all? The number of the dead at Jasenovac has been a matter of severe contention for years. Croatia’s late President, Franjo Tudjman, had been obsessed with the issue, and research he promoted suggested a figure closer to 50-60,000, including thousands of Romas, Jews and anti-Ustaša Croats. Tudjman’s insensitivity to the traumas of the Serbs in World War II, his rehabilitation of some Ustaša fellow travellers, and his generally fierce Croatian nationalism had a baleful influence in the conflict of the early 1990s, driving frightened Serbs into the hands of Milošević and his propagandists. But the numbers he came up with are almost certainly closer to the reality, and they constitute a damning enough indictment of the Ustaša regime.

My visits to the two monasteries on the Krka, both of them beautiful, historic institutions, brought home once again how miserably both the Catholic and Orthodox churches in this region, with honourable individual exceptions, have failed in their Christian mission. Both obsessed with their own nation’s rights and their own nation’s sufferings, wilfully blind to the pains of others, they have perverted and distorted the faith they both profess. It is surely a shame and a disgrace that these followers of Christ are the last people to look to in hope of reconciliation. Rather, they have persistently been at the forefront of the most uncompromisingly nationalist elements in their respective nations. They have been heralds of conflict and intolerance. The Balkans would have been better off without them.

Sunday, 18 March 2012

The Emirate of Sicily

One of the extraordinary things about visiting Sicily is the rich medley of diverse influences that make up its heritage: Roman; Byzantine; Norman; Baroque; and, perhaps most remarkable of all, Arab. For Sicily in the 9th to 11th centuries was ruled by Saracens, who for 120 years controlled the whole island, the Emirate of Sicily. Under Arab rule, Palermo became one of the great Muslim cities of the Mediterranean region, vying with Cordoba and Cairo. It was the second-largest city in Europe, after Cordoba, in Spain. At that time the two biggest cities in Europe were both Muslim. It is said that Palermo boasted some 300 mosques. The mosques are gone, and the Muslims there now are recent arrivals. But the older Arab influence is still discernible, for example in the cooking, in which couscous is a staple. And it can be seen in the architecture of buildings commissioned by Christian rulers in the century or so after the end of Muslim rule, who admired the Arab culture they found there.

Arab rule in Sicily was brought to an end by a Norman conquest in the 1060s and 1070s, which returned the island to Christian control. But the Muslim presence remained for more than a century under Norman rule, and continued to exert a powerful influence on the island. The Normans adopted a policy of religious tolerance, allowing eastern-rite Christians, Muslims and Jews to practice their faith alongside the western, Roman variant of Christianity that they themselves professed. For a few decades, Sicily was a remarkable multi-ethnic, multi-faith land. The interaction of its different peoples spawned a unique architectural and artistic style known as Norman-Arab, combining Norman, Arab and Byzantine flavours.


Church of St John of the Hermits, Palermo

The Arab influence is evident in many medieval buildings in Palermo. The exterior of the 12th Century church of St John of the Hermits, close by the Palazzo dei Normanni, with its ochre domes looks thoroughly middle-eastern, although the arches in the interior are unmistakably Norman. The austere little church of San Cataldo, on the central Piazza Bellini, is also topped by trademark Saracen domes.


La Zisa Palace, Palermo

I was particularly struck by the former royal palace of La Zisa, now situated a short distance from the city centre, but in its day the centre of a park outside the city. The very name of the palace is derived from the Arabic, al aziz, ‘magnificent’. The interior decoration includes typically Arab features, with ornately carved niches familiar in Islamic architecture in North Africa and Spain. Down the middle of the central hall runs one of the gentle little fountains (not working when I visited) that lend such an ambiance of peacefulness in Arab architecture. Later Baroque flourishes jar a little, but do not destroy the effect, and seem in a way in keeping with the spirit of amalgamation of different styles that is at the heart of Sicily’s heritage. A short distance away is the La Cuba building, as it name implies, a large square edifice, that once formed part of the same park as La Zisa. It is in less good condition, and is open to the sky. But along the top of the walls can be seen the same ornate Arabic stone carving, in another example of the fusion of Norman and Arab styles.


Palatine Chapel, Palermo

Palermo’s greatest medieval jewel is surely the Palatine Chapel, in the Palazzo dei Normanni. The palace was the seat of the medieval Norman rulers and, much rebuilt, today houses Sicily’s regional government. The chapel itself, once the private chapel of Sicily’s rulers, remains as it was, an exquisite blend of Norman architectural forms, Byzantine frescoes, and typically Islamic motifs. Before the Arab conquest, Sicily had come under the eastern half of the Roman Empire, its strongest links were with Constantinople, many of its people were Greek, and it followed the eastern variant of Christianity. This Byzantine influence remained strong, and the frescoes of the Palatine Chapel are among the finest to be seen. As remarkable are the typically Islamic designs, most notably in the beautifully ornate ceiling which, if not for the crosses incorporated into it, could have adorned an Islamic building in North Africa. Yet with this fusion of diverse influences, the overall effect is harmonious. Another marvellous example of this harmonious fusion is the magnificent cathedral at Monreale, in the hills above Palermo.

Not only did Sicily’s Norman rulers employ Arab architects, but they had Arab poets at their court, and Arab soldiers in their armies. And while the court language was French, they spoke Arabic, and used Arabic as well as Latin, Greek and Hebrew in their communications with their diverse subjects. The royal coronation mantel included an inscription in Arabic. The Arab traveller Ibn Jubair, who visited Sicily a century after the Norman conquest, described the splendour of Palermo, and remarked that there were too many mosques to be counted. He was struck by how well Muslims were treated, that many government officials were Muslim and that they enjoyed the full confidence of the ruler.


12th century plaque in Hebrew, Latin, Greek and Arabic,
La Zisa Palace, Palermo

On the wall outside the Palatine Chapel is a carved inscription in Latin, Greek and Arabic. Originally, it would have come from a bell tower that once stood outside the chapel. The inscription celebrates a 12-Century water clock that was once there. The La Ziza palace contains an exhibition of medieval artefacts. Among them is a 12th Century plaque commemorating a notable lady, written in Hebrew, Latin, Greek and Arabic.

But sadly this remarkable example of medieval multiculturalism was not destined to survive. Even during the Norman period, many Muslims converted to Christianity, the religion of the rulers, just as many Christians had earlier converted to Islam under Arab rule. Muslims may have been tolerated under the Normans, but their position was always subordinate and dependent on royal protection. Following the end of Norman rule at the end of the 12th Century, Sicily became part of the Holy Roman Empire, and that protection was withdrawn. As the island was torn apart by fighting over the succession at the end of the 12th Century and the first years of the 13th, a Muslim rebellion took control of much its territory. In 1224 the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, having defeated the Muslim rebels, decided to deport them to the Italian mainland, where a Muslim colony survived at Lucera until the end of the century.

As modern Europeans debate the merits or otherwise of globalisation and multiculturalism, and question whether the Christian and secular West can co-exist with Islam, it is worth recalling that these questions are not new, and that a thousand years ago cooperation and synthesis between different cultural traditions fostered things of beauty that continue to attest to the fact that antagonism between diverse cultures is not inevitable. Through tolerance and exchange in medieval Sicily there flowered a unique culture based on respect, sharing and the blending of different traditions. Medieval Sicily was an important junction for interaction and exchange between the Christian and Muslim worlds, and in its way, a kind of beacon. In the marvellous architecture it has bequeathed, it could also serve as an example today.

Thursday, 16 February 2012

Sofi Oksanen's "Purge"

“Purge”, a novel by Sofi Oksanen, a Finnish-Estonian author, spans three generations of Estonian women caught up in the traumas of world war, occupation and the break-up of the Soviet Union half a century later. It follows the story of Aliide Truu, an elderly lady who, in recently independent Estonia in 1992, takes in a dishevelled young girl she finds lying in the yard of her farmhouse. As the two women circle each other mistrustfully, we read of Aliide’s jealousy in her youth for her elder sister, Ingel, who found happiness in her marriage to Hans, a local peasant boy with whom she, Aliide, was infatuated. The family is broken apart by Soviet occupation during and after the Second World War. The girls’ parents are arrested and disappear, never to be seen again. Hans, having enlisted with the Germans fighting on the eastern front, returns to join the resistance to the Soviet occupiers in the forests, and is hidden by the sisters in the family home. Suspecting them of being in contact with Hans, the local communists interrogate, humiliate and sexually abuse the sisters, as well as the little daughter of Ingel and Hans.

Traumatised, Aliide marries an Estonian communist, Martin, in order to protect herself. Ingel and her daughter are deported to the far corners of the Soviet Empire, leaving Aliide, with Martin, to take over the family home. Unbeknownst to Martin, Hans, overwrought with grief for his wife and daughter, is still hidden in the house. Now Aliide has Hans to herself. She will look after him and, without Ingel to eclipse her, surely, she hopes, he will at last see her own virtues…

The young girl, Zara, a Russian who speaks Estonian, as Aliide observes, has also been a victim of political upheaval in the lawlessness of the breakup of the Soviet Union; trafficked, forced into prostitution and sexual slavery by men much like those who had abused Aliide decades earlier. Now they are gangsters, but one of them is ex-KGB. The times change; the men don’t. Zara’s experiences shock us with the appalling human degradation suffered by some amid the euphoria of the collapse of communism. Zara has fled their clutches, and now is desperate to make her escape complete before they catch up with her. As we guess from an early stage, and as Aliide eventually discovers, Zara is in fact the granddaughter of Ingel, who, in her desperation, has come to the only address she knows in Estonia, written by her grandmother on the back of a photo of a young Ingel and Aliide.

It is a powerful story about how lives are wrecked in the upheavals of their times; about how fraught times throw up pitiless people for whom no amount of cruelty is too much. And about the compromises and ambiguities that some are forced into. Aliide is abused. But in her fear and in her consuming jealousy of Ingel, she commits acts of great evil.

As to the men, they are less finely drawn than the main female characters, to some extent caricatures. Hans appears to be everything wholesome and noble in a man, the simple peasant, handsome, strong, devoted and loyal, who defends his country. The portrayal of Martin, by contrast, elicits not only moral disapproval, but physical revulsion. Oksanen dwells on his fetid armpits, the hair in them matted with sweat. The smell of his armpits sticks to Aliide’s hair and skin, and stays in her nostrils all day. Ingel comments that Aliide is starting to smell like a Russian, like the hordes of Russians pouring in to work in the new factories in Estonia. There are repeated references to the Russian habit of wiping their mouths on their sleeves, which Martin, and eventually Aliide adopt. The inference seems plain: the Russians are not just brutal occupiers; they are uncivilised barbarians. Without downplaying the terrible Estonian experience under Soviet rule, such images read like racial slurs. It is all a bit much.

The German soldiers who visit the family home during their turn at occupying Estonia are, by contrast, nice, wholesome, polite young boys. This is a not uncommon perspective in the Baltic states, where the experience of Soviet occupation is generally remembered as having been much worse than that of the relatively benign Germans. It is, of course, a view which can be sustained only if one forgets the slaughter of the Baltic Jews, in which some Baltic people participated. Oksanen makes only a passing reference to Jewish suffering at the hands of the Germans; a brief mention of a Jewish family that fled to Soviet territory before the German advance. The only other reference to Jews is that the man of the family, having returned with the Soviets, is present at one of the sessions of interrogation and abuse of the sisters at the town hall. This appears gratuitous. Only two references to a Jewish family, and they were after all collaborators in the brutality of Russian occupation.

Oksanen acknowledges the ambiguities and difficult choices that many had to make. Most notably Aliide, who accommodates herself to the regime that had abused her in order to survive, although her jealousy and spitefulness towards Ingel takes her well beyond the collaboration required for survival. Revulsion towards Martin is perhaps slightly mitigated by the fact that he is no hypocrite or cynic in his devotion to the communist ideal. A true and enthusiastic believer in the communist dream, and all its promises of a better world, in later life he struggles to come to terms with the emptiness of the dream brought home by the Chernobyl disaster.

It is a fine novel. But the unremitting negative stereotyping of Russians, even down to personal hygiene, mars the book. And it sits uneasily with the much more skimpy and positive portrayal of the German occupiers.

Thursday, 5 January 2012

Muhammad Ali: the Albanian who ruled Egypt

Sitting atop Cairo’s citadel, the hill that had been fortified in the 12th Century by Saladin as a key highpoint dominating the city, is the large Alabaster Mosque. Apart from its commanding position, it stands out due to its architectural style, which differs significantly from the numerous older mosques around it. Commissioned in the first half of the 19th Century, the mosque’s architect was an Ottoman Turk. Its design, with its large central dome, surrounded by smaller domes, and thin, pointed minarets, consciously imitated that of the great mosques of Istanbul. Egypt had been under nominal Ottoman sovereignty since the 16th Century, but its Mamluk rulers had retained considerable autonomy, and continued to build mosques in their own style, quite distinct from that of the Ottomans.


The Alabaster Mosque, Cairo

The mosque was commissioned by Muhammad Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt for most of the first half of the 19th Century, who is feted by some as the father of modern Egypt. And Muhammad Ali was Albanian. Under his rule, the beginnings of a modern state were built, and a modern army. At its height, he extended Egypt’s dominion to include Sudan, western Arabia and Syria, his armies marching even into Anatolia, where they inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of the Sultan in 1832. His power far outreached that of his nominal sovereign, and Istanbul itself lay at his feet before the European powers intervened to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

How did an Albanian come to wield such power in a foreign land? Muhammad Ali was born in what is today Greek Macedonia. He went to Egypt as second-in-command of an Albanian contingent in the Ottoman army that was sent to restore Ottoman control in the power vacuum that followed the withdrawal of the French, who occupied the country from 1798-1801. By a mixture of military campaigning and deft political intrigue, Muhammad Ali established himself as the new Wali (Governor) of Egypt. Still nominally beholden to the Sultan, he was in practice an independent ruler, who founded a dynasty that reined until 1953, when Gamal Abdel Nasser declared a republic.


Muhammad Ali Pasha

Like many great rulers in the Middle East’s history, his strength was also bolstered by a capacity for ruthlessness and cruelty. Notably, early in his rule he eliminated the power of the Mamluks when he invited them to a festive celebration in Cairo, following which they were slaughtered. Standing on the citadel, with its hazy views across Cairo to the pyramids at Giza, you can see the spot where it happened, below the walls, in the narrow road leading down from the hill to the citadel gate. As they processed down to the gate, it was slammed shut by some of Muhammad Ali’s loyal Albanians, who then proceeded to kill them.

I found mixed feelings among the Egyptians I spoke to about Muhammad Ali. Some were prepared to acknowledge his importance for Egypt. For the taxi driver who brought me into the city from the airport, he was just one in a long succession of foreign rulers stretching back more than two millennia, before the takeover by Nasser, in his view the first truly Egyptian ruler since ancient times. Nasser was my driver’s hero. King Farouk, who was overthrown by Nasser’s revolution in 1952, he excoriated as a corrupt foreigner. The recently ousted Hosni Mubarak he considered even worse.

For many, Muhammad Ali was interested more in his personal aggrandisement than that of Egypt. Indeed, he milked Egypt for the funds needed for his reforms, and appropriated nearly all Egyptian land. And his foreignness was evident in more ways than the design of the mosque he commissioned. Throughout his rein, Turkish, not Arabic, was the official language of his court. And contemporaries who met him attested that, while he spoke Turkish competently, the only language he was really fluent in was Albanian. Yet his is a remarkable story. That an Albanian, a man from a small nation in what for many is an obscure corner of the Balkans, came to dominate and rule a large swathe of the Middle East, and laid the foundations of the modern Egyptian state.